1 I celebrate myself, and sing myself, And what I assume you shall assume, For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. I loafe and invite my soul. Job interview questions and sample answers list, tips, guide and advice. Helps you prepare job interviews and practice interview skills and techniques. A hedge is an investment position intended to offset potential losses or gains that may be incurred by a companion investment. In simple language, a hedge is used to. Cuban Missile Crisis - Wikipedia. The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis (Spanish: Crisis de Octubre), the Caribbean Crisis (Russian: . The confrontation is often considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full- scale nuclear war. An agreement was reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Fidel Castro in July 1. The United States elections, 1. United States and the White House had denied charges that it was ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles 9. Florida. The missile preparations were confirmed when an Air Force U- 2 spy planeproduced clear photographic evidence of medium- range (SS- 4) and intermediate- range (R- 1. The US established a military blockade to prevent further missiles from reaching Cuba. It announced that they would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and demanded that the weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union. Retrouvez toutes les discothèque Marseille et se retrouver dans les plus grandes soirées en discothèque à Marseille. The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis (Spanish: Crisis de Octubre), the Caribbean Crisis (Russian: Is and in to a was not you i of it the be he his but for are this that by on at they with which she or from had we will have an what been one if would who has her. Complete listing of all downloadable movie scripts and movie screenplays available on the internet. After a long period of tense negotiations, an agreement was reached between US President John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev. Publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union, subject to United Nations verification, in exchange for a US public declaration and agreement to avoid invading Cuba again. Secretly, the United States also agreed that it would dismantle all U. S.- built Jupiter MRBMs, which had been deployed in Turkey and Italy against the Soviet Union. When all offensive missiles and Ilyushin Il- 2. Cuba, the blockade was formally ended on November 2. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union pointed out the necessity of a quick, clear, and direct communication line between Washington and Moscow. As a result, the Moscow–Washington hotline was established. A series of agreements reduced US- Soviet tensions for several years. Earlier US actions. Such an involvement would also directly defy the Monroe Doctrine, a US policy limiting US involvement in European colonies and European affairs but holding that the Western Hemisphere was in the US sphere of influence. The Kennedy administration had been publicly embarrassed by the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1. President John F. Kennedy by CIA- trained forces of Cuban exiles. Afterward, former President Dwight Eisenhower told Kennedy that . Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev asserted, . In fact, the US led the Soviets by a wide margin that would only increase. In 1. 96. 1, the Soviets had only four intercontinental ballistic missiles (R- 7 Semyorka). By October 1. 96. It also had eight George Washington– and Ethan Allen–class ballistic missile submarines, with the capability to launch 1. Polaris missiles each, with a range of 2,5. Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to the world that the Soviets were building missiles . The Soviet Union had medium- range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 7. The US had a considerable advantage in total number of nuclear warheads (2. The US also led in missile defensive capabilities, naval and air power; but the Soviets had a 2- 1 advantage in conventional ground forces, more pronounced in field guns and tanks, particularly in the European theater. In 1. 96. 2, the Soviets had only 2. ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the Soviet Union. A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1. The missiles could hit American allies and most of Alaska from Soviet territory but not the Contiguous US. Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, points out, . In order to meet the threat it faced in 1. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one. The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion of Berlin a grave threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that if the US did nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba, he could muscle the West out of Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western countermeasures in Berlin. If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets after it became aware of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand trading the missiles for West Berlin. Since Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba, the trade would be a win for Khrushchev, as Kennedy recognized: . They obtained a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. However, according to another source, Castro objected to the missiles deployment that would have made him look like a Soviet puppet, but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communists, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront the Americans . Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a cold region and being outfitted with ski boots, fleece- lined parkas, and other winter equipment. The Anadyr River flows into the Bering Sea, and Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky District and a bomber base in the far eastern region. All the measures were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On September 7, Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Anatoly Dobrynin assured United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Adlai Stevenson that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. On September 1. 1, the Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Soviet News Agency TASS) announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On October 1. 3, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Russian- built Mi. G- 2. 1 fighters and Il- 2. U- 2 spyplanes found S- 7. Dvina (NATO designation SA- 2) surface- to- air missile sites at eight different locations. CIA director John A. Mc. Cone was suspicious. Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned, . On August 3. 1, Senator Kenneth Keating (R- New York), who received his information from Cuban exiles in Florida, warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union may be constructing a missile base in Cuba. He charged the Kennedy administration of covering up a major threat to the US. The R- 1. 2 was a medium- range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami. US intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles. Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas- covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missiles could turn. The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed. Air Force's Strategic Air Command flew over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese- operated U- 2. US officials were worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U- 2, initiating another international incident. In a meeting with members of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) on 1. September, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor Mc. George Bundy heavily restricted further U- 2 flights over Cuban airspace. The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the . US officials attempted to use a Corona photoreconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH- 4 mission on 1 October was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence. The US first obtained U- 2 photographic evidence of the missiles on October 1. U- 2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 9. DIA analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS- 4 construction site at San Crist. This identification was made, in part, on the strength of reporting provided by Oleg Penkovsky, a double agent in the GRU working for CIA and MI6. Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U- 2 imagery. Mc. Namara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U- 2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's analysis of the images. Stern, head of the Kennedy library transcribed some of them. The EXCOMM quickly discussed several possible courses of action. This game tree models how both actors would have considered their decisions. It is broken down into a simple form for basic understanding.
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